Club提要：在北京对话和联合国南方中心South Center共同主办、中国公共外交协会指导的“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会上，南非国家行政学院院长、北京对话特约专家布萨尼·恩卡韦尼（Busani Ngcaweni）就治国理政做相关发言。

恩卡韦尼认为，全球南方国家应通过建立发展型治国方略，强化国家机构能力，促进基础设施和生产能力的投资，以及推动贸易和金融体系的民主化来解决贫困、失业和不平等的问题。

8月24-25日，北京对话邀请国内外专家继续就“金砖国家与多极世界构建”展开对话。为了更好地承上启下，我们精选部分特约专家在五月份研讨会上的发言，以中英文形式陆续发布。

以下为恩卡韦尼发言：

恩卡韦尼在“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会发言 （图源：北京对话）

大家早上好，今天你们提出了一些有挑战的问题，这些问题也非常实际，使我更深入地思考全球南方面临的问题。其中一个问题就是两极分化，这是全球南方国家的优先关注事项。我们如何支持全球南方的发展？全球南方的许多国家正在努力解决国家发展的基本问题，例如解决贫困、失业和不平等。人们普遍认为，通过发展经济、投资、提高生产能力，以及使这些国家能够向外界交易和销售他们的商品和服务，可以应对这些挑战。这些是全球南方许多国家的首要关切。

对于金砖和其他想要有所作为的机制来说，更大的问题是如何支持全球南方许多国家的主要关切。当我们讨论转变全球范围国际金融架构时，希望全球南方那些脆弱的国家有意愿且自信地参与到对话中。我们应使他们充分意识到，我们已经解决了关于去美元化或类似话题可能引起的不确定性。一旦他们有意愿且自信地认为这次对话也有助于他们自己的国家发展，他们参与进来就会变得更容易。

对于我们全球南方国家来说，即使是我们中最脆弱的国家，也确实与全球北方国家有某种形式的贸易联系，或者，我们实际上因为债务问题欠他们的钱。全球南方正面临低储蓄率和其他财政压力，这些压力源于资金的运用方式。资金被用于贸易、投资、借贷、信贷和储蓄等多种经济活动。

如果我们了解这些资金的主要用途，那我们就能够知道在许多情况下，低投资及低储蓄水平，会导致各国无力增加变革以增加贸易，从而面临债务挑战。因此，各国必须明白，这样的对话将支持他们去解决主要关切，而像中国这样的国家或全球南方中更强大的合作伙伴则应发挥更大的作用、承担更大的责任。我们知道，在全球北方，有一种想法是利用治国方略来追求霸权。他们在这一领域使用的是货币手段和军事力量。

对于全球南方中实力较强的国家，如中国，挑战在于如何有效运用“发展型治国方略”，这种方略与霸权型治国方略背道而驰。这意味着要解决全球南方最小国家的主要关切，要通过增加对基础设施和制造能力的投入，以及建设国家能力。像“一带一路”倡议这样的项目正是为了实现这一目标，因为它们代表了发展型治国方略。这涉及到将资源引入一个国家，以增强其生产能力并开放贸易走廊，而不是依赖储备货币的力量，或者使用其他强制性手段来使他国顺从。

如果我们探索发展型治国方略，这包括建设生产能力、提高投资率、以及促进中国与全球南方其他国家之间的贸易，我们就能在追求这种战略的同时解决他们的一些主要关切。这个议程是使全球金融体系民主化，而目前该体系既不民主，又被垄断和滥用，全球南方的人们深受其害。尽管公众并不经常承认，但一个众所周知的事实是，美元带来的挑战并非全球南方所独有。实际上，即使在包括欧洲在内的全球北方，一些国家也还没有完全从2008年的危机中恢复过来。

如果下一次危机来临，像欧盟中的PIGS（葡萄牙、意大利、希腊和西班牙）这样的许多国家可能会陷入更深的困境,我们知道这些经济体尚未完全从危机中恢复。全球南方国家可能发现自己与西方国家处于类似的处境，但葡萄牙、意大利和希腊仍然面临着储备货币问题的挑战。还有一些国家类似于南非，如果你关注我们的货币实力和通货膨胀，就可以看到我们一直都在紧紧追随着我们的储备货币。

所以，如果美国把自己的通货膨胀输出到其他国家，尤其是全球南方国家，这将对发展很不利。很重要的一点就是大家要关注全球金融系统的民主化。我们做好这件事情的话，我们就能够去解决全球南方国家很多迫在眉睫的危机。这样他们（全球南方国家）知道会有更多的投资，他们也能够通过“一带一路”参与到更多的投资项目当中，因为这会帮助到他们制造业，这样他们就有足够的信心参与进来。因为在全球南方国家的某些情况下，如果你提出这个话题，人们会说北京对话在说什么？可信吗？所以我们必须致力于增长全球南方国家的信心，以便他们能够参与并正面展开对话。但解决他们的主要关切，这是一个长期的过程，即应对失业、贫困和不平等三重挑战的增长。

但最后，这是不可逆转的。我认为这次对话的主题实际上是关于不可逆性的讨论，每个人都同意这一点。拥有储备货币的国家将不得不使用其他形式的霸权手段，因为仅使用货币或美元以及军事力量已不再足够。这是因为变化的趋势和轨迹是不可逆转的。

会议讨论非常有趣，所以我也努力想象，如果最不发达国家的代表在这，会作何感想？因为他们正面临着国内非常严峻的挑战。为了保持政府的合法性，政府需要向自己的选民证明他们正在解决发展问题。这便引出了我之前提出的问题，我们承担着更大的责任，因为这场讨论可能会在一些全球南方国家中引起不确定性，因为他们所知道的只有当前这个体系。如果不清楚新体系将如何帮助他们解决直接需求，他们可能需要更长的时间来接受。尤其一些由全球北方资助的学者，正在到全球南方最脆弱的国家（游说），对他们说,中国正致力于停止使用美元，而使用人民币，使用中文，这是他们对全球南方脆弱的国家进行宣传时的话术。所以，在（类似）这样的对话中，他们可能会立即关闭对话，因为这对他们来说没有直接的意义。

中国确实从现有体系收益良多，但中国也愿意成为这个体系的变革者。更大的问题是，中国是否愿意在这个过渡期中作为担保人坚持这一（变革）进程，让那些愿意参与并支持这场改革的国家知道有一个担保人存在。正如我所说，这个担保人不是像全球北方那样的霸权力量，而是使用其他措施建立信心，因为在一些国家中，这些紧迫的问题可以得到解决。对于中国来说，中国不仅要发展先进的制造业，同时中国也有很多直接的机会，如果这些转变发生，新的就业岗位就会在全球南方产生，可以真正的支持经济体的转型。

现在还有一个很大的机会，这个是被称之为“新黄金”的矿物质。中国现在是这些矿物质的最大的消费国，我们如何利用这些矿物质在全球南方推动某种形式的工业化？因为如果他们看到工业化发生了，看到工作机会的出现，看到他们生产的产品在中国、印度和其他国家的消费市场出现，这将建立他们的信心和这些（脆弱）国家的合法性。因为这样人们就不认为领导层只是在全球范围内参与非常复杂的对话。实际上，还有其他紧迫的问题，因此保持平衡很重要，这样我们就不会在这个对话中让任何人掉队。因为在一些文化中，当人们进行这种对话时可能会感到威胁，经济学家受过这方面的培训，他们理解这个系统很长时间，但对于一些领导全球南方国家的人来说，这就像是核物理学给他们的冲击，他们会立即关闭对话，他们会退出对话，或者他们只是为了形式而继续对话。

如果投票决定，那么这样不会对决策产生影响。否则的话，他们会因为自己不理解而去保持中立。所以，这是面向像南方中心等机构的更大挑战之一，那就是建立起这样的一种能力，帮助全球南方的国家的人民，使得他们能够去更加有信心，更加全面地投入到这类的对话当中，以便他们完全了解到所面临的困境是什么，以及如何去解决他们国家发展遇到的这些难题。

我想再强调一点，我们作为全球南方国家要做的，还有像金砖这样的机构要做的，就是要去投资建设国家机构，因为如果我们没有在建立足够国家能力的情况下进行这项工作，讨论将是不平等的，而且会在一些文化中引起焦虑。因为在全球南方国家中，有一些国家正面临着冲突或危机，所以我们必须要有我今天所说的国家治理。在霸权式的治国和发展式治国上是有根本性的不同的。发展型国家治理在某种意义上是指我们利用我们所拥有的权力、资源、权威和影响力来建立机构，进行投资，建设生产能力，和发展人力资本。发展型国家治理基于相互尊重和人与人之间的互动。而霸权型国家治理则是基于威胁。货币一种手段，军事也是。货币和军事只是帝国用来控制他人的众多权力矩阵中的两个例子。

所以我想强调的是在对话中，我们必须要团结、要相互支持。使得我们在这里讨论的努力不取决于谁是总统，而必须在国家内部制度化。我们不能让组织如此依赖个人，以至于即使有两位领导人可能彼此不喜欢，（已经提出的）倡议仍将得以持续，这不应该基于我与坐在我旁边的人相互之间感觉如何。

（翻译：毛琪）

恩卡韦尼在“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会与其他专家交流（图源：北京对话）以下为英文原文：

Good morning, colleagues. Let me also greet my ambassador from South Africa. You've raised some difficult questions this morning, which are also very practical. Sitting across from Marco, I've been prompted to think more deeply about the issues facing the Global South. One such issue is polarization, a priority concern for the countries of the Global South. How can we support the national development agenda in these regions? Many countries in the Global South are grappling with fundamental aspects of national development, such as addressing poverty, unemployment, and inequality. It is understood that these challenges can be tackled by growing economies, through investment, by increasing productive capacities, and by enabling these countries to trade and sell their goods and services to the outside world. These are the primary concerns for many countries in the Global South.

The bigger question for BRICS and other progressive institutions is howto invest in supporting these primary concerns of many countries in the Global South. Such that, when we talk about transforming the global international financial architecture, those countries in the Global South that are vulnerable can engage in the conversation comfortably and confidently. They should be fully aware that we have addressed the uncertainties that might arise from discussions about de-dollarization or similar topics. Once they are comfortable and confident that this conversation is also in aid of their own national development concerns, it becomes easier for them to engage.

We know that even the most vulnerable countries in the Global South have some form of trade relationship with countries of the Global North, or owe money to them due to debt issues. The Global South faces low savings rates and several other fiscal pressures, which we understand are because of how money is used. Money is used for trade and exchange, for investment, loans, credits, and savings.

If we understand that there’s a basic primary uses of these and many instances that countries are facing debt challenges as a consequence of their inability to increase change to increase the trade because there are low levels of investments, and low levels of savings. Therefore, countries must understand that this conversation will support them to deal with their primary concerns and countries like China or the stronger partners in the Global South have a much bigger role and responsibility to play. We know that in the Global North, there is an idea there which is using statecraft to pursue hegemony. What they use in the domain is the currency as well as the military power.

The challenge, therefore, for countries like China, stronger in the Global South is how China uses, what I call, ‘developmental statecraft’, which counters the hegemonic statecraft to the extent that we use developmental statecraft. This means addressing the primary concerns of the smallest countries in the Global South, which is increasing the rate of investment of infrastructure in manufacturing capabilities,  building state capacity.  Programs like BRI are an attempt to do that because it is developmental statecraft where you are bringing resources into a country to build its own productive capabilities to open corridors of trade, as opposed to using the power of the currency being a reserve currency or using any other cohesive means to put people into line.

If we explore this idea of developmental statecraft, which is building productive capabilities, increasing the rate of investment, and increasing trade betweenChina and other countries in the Global South, we can address some of their primary concerns while pursuing a global strategic agenda. This agenda is to democratize the global financial system because currently, it is not democratic, it is monopolized and it is abused and those who suffer from it are those who are in the Global South. In fact, it is understood, although many people don’t acknowledge it in public that the challenges of the dollar are not just the challenges that are felt by us in the Global South. In fact, in the Global North, in Europe and so on, some of them haven’t fully recovered from the 2008 crisis.

If the next crisis comes, there are many countries like PIGS in the EU who themselves might be in much deeper trouble. When the next financial crisis comes we know that those economies have not fully recovered as the Global South might be in the west position, but Portugal, Italy and Greece, they still have some challenges emanating from problems that are happening in the reserve currency. And finally, there are countries like us in South Africa, if you look at the strength of our currency, if you look at inflation you will see that we track very closely what happens to the reserve currency. If the inflation rate because the US exports its inflation, if you track what's happening in many currencies in the Global South is linked to what happens to the currency of the reserve currency. Therefore, it is important that people pursue this agenda of democratizing the global financial asymmetry so that as we do that, we are addressing the primary concerns of the countries of the Global South. So they know that they can trade more. They know that there will be more investment and initiatives like BIR are important because they are going to fix them, building capital. They know that we can build dynamics capabilities in those countries so that they are confident enough to engage on this because in some cases in the Global South, if you raise this conversation, people will say what is the Beijing Club talking about? So it is key therefore that we must invest in the confidence and the dynamic capabilities of the countries in the Global South to be able to engage and take this discussion head-on but address their primary concerns, which include investment, growth, and tackling the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty, and inequality.

But lastly, it is irreversible. I think the theme of this conversation is really irreversible and everybody agrees that it is irreversible. The reserve currency country will have to use other forms of hegemony beyond the two uses which are money or the dollar as well as the military because the trend and trajectory of change are irreversible.

The conversation is interesting. I've been trying to imagine if we had the least developed countries here listening to this conversation and how they would be feeling and reacting. Given the fact that they are facing certain exigencies at home where they come from, for them to retain legitimacy, as governments they need to prove to their constituencies that they are dealing with their immediate concerns of development, which then raises the issue that I raised earlier on that we carry much bigger responsibility that, as this debate may raise uncertainty amongst some in the Global South, because all they know is the system as it exists today. And that if it is unclear about what the new system will represent and how the new system will help them solve their immediate contents. It may take longer to accept it because there is a counter-narrative emerging elsewhere where the scholars, especially those who are sponsored by the Global North are going into the most fragile countries in the Global South to say China is saying stop using the dollar and to use the RMB, China is staying stop using your language. They are spreading coefficient institute. They are saying to use their language. That is the narrative that is imaging that is being used so that you create uncertainty amongst the fragile states in the Global South. So when you have this type of conversation, they will immediately switch off because it doesn't make immediate sense to them.

And you’re correct, China benefits from the system, but China is willing to be a disruptor of the system. So the bigger question is whether China is willing to stay the course as a guarantor during this transition. Will China remain a strong guarantor for those states who are willing to engage in this conversation and support it? They need to know that there is a guarantor that does not use the hard statecraft or hegemonic power as it is used in the Global North, but instead uses other measures that build confidence. This is because, in some of these states, these immediate concerns can be addressed. China's discussions on pursuing higher-quality growth and advancing into higher-end manufacturing suggest potential opportunities. It implies that while certain jobs may no longer be viable due to ongoing transformations, new opportunities could arise in the Global South, providing employment and aiding the economic transition of these nations.

There is a big opportunity now arising from the race for the‘new gold’, which is the critical minerals. How can we use those as leverage, especially considering China is  the biggest consumer of those critical minerals at the moment. How can we use critical minerals to do some form of industrialisation in the Global South? Because if they witness industrialization taking place, see jobs being created, and see the products they produce being consumed in markets like China, India and elsewhere, it builds confidence and the legitimacy of those countries. This prevents people from thinking that their leadership is only engaged in very complex global conversations. In fact, addressing other immediate concerns is important to maintain balance and ensure no one is left behind in this conversation. Because it can be threatening in some cultures when people are having this conversation. Economists are trained in these, they understand they've checked the system for long but for some of the people who are leading in the countries in the Global South, this is nuclear physics for them and they will immediately shut out and they will exit the conversation or they will stay in the room just to fill in the register.

But it will have no impacton their decision-making if they were to go elsewhere where they might be a vote or an opt-in thing. They will stay neutral because they don’t understand. So that's part of the bigger challenge for institutions like the South Centre and others, which are tasked with building dynamic capabilities for people in the Global South, so that they can fully and confidently engage with this conversation, knowing fully what the upside is for them, how it will address the immediate concerns of national development.

No, mine is not a question. It’s just an issue of emphasis. The point raised earlieris what we need to do for countries of the Global South and institutions like BRICS and others to invest in building state institutions. If we undertake this work without building sufficient state capacity, the discussions will be uneven. It will raise anxieties in certain cultures because that is the reality of the country. So many countries in the Global South have emerged out of conflicts or have other sorts of vulnerabilities, including fiscal crisis, and so on. we have to statecraft. And in this instance, I am referring to statecraft, which I call 'developmental (statecraft)'. There is a difference between hegemonic statecraft and developmental statecraft. Developmental statecraft is in a sense that we use the power, resources, authority and influence that we have to build institutions, make investments, build productive capacity, and develop human capital in those countries. Developmental statecraft is based on mutual respect and people-to-people conduct. In contrast,  hegemonic statecraft is based on using the authority that I have over you. And the currency is one of them, and so is the military. There are many other matrices of power that an empire uses in order to control others.

It is important to emphasize that in our discussions, we must focus on building or supporting each other in developing sustainable and dynamic state capabilities. These initiatives should not be contingent on who is the president at any given time. They should be institutionalized within states. We should avoid making organizations overly dependent on personal relationships, ensuring that initiatives are sustained regardless of personal feelings between leaders.